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Abstract 
A large number of candidates have become a regular feature of Indian elections. Given 
the regulatory concerns the problem has evoked, the paper reviews the process of 
candidate entry in select developed countries. The review reveals the presence of 
diverse approaches, ruling out the necessity for extreme options like debarring fringe 
candidates – a course suggested by several Indian expert groups. Among various policy 
options, India had largely relied on electoral deposit.  Our results suggest that an 
increase in deposit had a significant negative impact on candidate entry in India. 
However, for an effective deterrence, India needs to continue to keep deposits at a very 
high level compared to the current international benchmark, discriminating political 
participation of genuinely underprivileged groups. In contrast, the current level of 
signature requirement, a relatively unused policy tool in India, was found to be too low 
and could be easily increased further in order to be effective. We argue that given the 
high variation and lack of stability in candidate structure across regions and over time, a 
local approach on signature requirement -- as in the US -- could be an effective deterrent 
in India. Accordingly, we suggest that the Election Commission of India (ECI) should not 
only have the power to determine the deposit before each election, it should also have 
the power to change the minimum signature requirement across constituencies (subject 
to some standard checks and balances).  
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More can be Less: Hyper Plurality of Candidates, the Rationality 
of Electoral Choice and Need for Electoral Reform in India 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In terms of scale of operation, logistics and active involvement of number of 
people, Indian parliamentary election is one of the biggest events of its kind in 
the world. Since independence, fifteen elections of the lower house of the 
parliament (Lok Sabha) had taken place in India. These elections had been 
conducted under the watchful guidance of the Election Commission of India 
(ECI). The ECI has, over the years, molded itself as one of the strongest pillars of 
Indian democracy. Regular conduction of largely free and fair elections in India 
by the ECI has given democracy in India a lot of credibility among its citizenry, 
and also in other countries1.   
 
Empirical data on elections in India, however, reveal a worrying trend. Since 
1980s, the number of candidates participating in elections in India had been very 
high, sometimes even more than one hundred.2  From regulatory perspective, 
the emergence of large number of candidates is a major challenge to Indian 
electoral authorities.  Unfortunately, a systematic study on the regulatory 
implications of this phenomenon is not available in the literature. In particular, it is 
not clear to what extent policymakers should block entries of the so called ―non-
serious‖ candidates and how.  
 
There is a debate among political scientists on whether electoral regulations that 
block entries of candidates serve the purpose. Arguments in favor of restriction 
are generally based on manageability of elections. They highlight the high 
transaction cost associated with unrestricted entry and argue that if unchecked, it 
could undermine the sanctity of the electoral process itself (McKnight, 1999). 
Many political scientists, however, are not comfortable with this view. They argue 
that the impact of fringe candidates should not be judged by their electoral 
success alone. The issues that they raise and fight for often change the nature of 
the electoral debate and force the incumbents to change their behavior (Brancati, 
2008; Bolleyera and Weeks, 2009; Copus et al, 2009; Weeks, 2009). As per this 
view, artificial restrictions on electoral entry choke the voices of dissent and as a 
result, diversity of opinions – so necessary in a democracy -- suffers at the cost 
of manageability. Some political scientists also argue that attempts to artificially 
                                                 
1
 A pan-India survey of more than 8000 people conducted by Mitra (2010) revealed that more 
than 60 per cent people in India perceived the power to change government as an important 
ingredient of citizenship. Recently, William Sweeny, the chief of International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES), described the ECI as a ―global leader‖ in electoral regulation (Times of 
India, May 20, 2012). 
2
 During Parliamentary elections in 1996, Nalgonda constituency in Andhra Pradesh and 
Belgaum constituency in Karnataka had 480 and 456 candidates respectively.   
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restrict electoral participation had never succeeded and had generally been 
counter-productive in the long-run (Arora, 2002).3 
 
Unfortunately, regulatory agencies worldwide sometimes tend to arrive at policy 
positions without a proper theoretical framework that attempts to explain why a 
high number of candidates have suddenly appeared or could appear. An 
unintended consequence of this is often an articulation in favor of extreme 
positions like banning the entries of the so called ―non-serious‖ candidates.4 In 
most cases, however, restriction on entries is not explicit. Still, in practice, all 
democracies put certain regulatory restrictions on entries (e.g., submission of a 
deposit fee, provision of documentary evidence of support of a minimum number 
of electors etc).  
 
In this paper, the normative position that we take is rooted to theories of political 
party formation. Existing literature on party system generally offers three different 
approaches to explain candidate structure in elections in a country. The first 
approach is based on political opportunity (Pennings and Keman, 2003) and the 
second and the third are based respectively on changes in the cleavage structure 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Inglehart,1997; Mitra and Singh, 1999; Chhibber, 
1999) and institutional environment (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Hug 2000).  
We observe that transformation of cleavages in a polity is a slow process. 
Accordingly, if candidate structure is determined by cleavages, it should also 
change gradually. A sudden large rise in the number of candidates reflects 
political uncertainty and should raise regulatory concern -– especially when there 
is no change in the institutional environment.  
 
In a first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system as in India, candidate structure 
could be unstable due to: (i) manipulative nature of competition among political 
parties, and, (ii) the process of fielding party candidates by them. The first could 
lead to fielding of clone candidates (―dummies‖) by major political parties against 
their rivals.5 When two or more political parties engage in such behavior, a 
prisoners‘ dilemma type game unfolds, leading to a sharp rise in the number of 
candidates in a constituency (Bhattacharya, 2010). A non-transparent or 
‗authoritarian‘ candidate selection process within a political party may also lead to 
a lot of rebel candidates, increasing the total number of candidates further.  
 
                                                 
3
 An interesting example is Tanzania where independent candidates were legally prohibited to 
take part in general elections. Findings, however, suggest their de facto presence in these 
elections (Mateng‘e, 2012). 
4
 For example, out of the 52 democracies in Brancati (2008), 18 explicitly restricted participation 
of independent candidates in elections at the national level. 
5
 Both the academic and the regulatory literature on voting has admitted the possibility of cloning 
for a long time. Tideman (1987), for example, proposed ―independence of clones‖ as a criterion in 
deciding about ―optimal‖ voting rules. Some other studies on this area are Zavist and Tideman 
(1989), Dutta et al (2001), Schulze (2003), Faliszewski et al (2009) and Elkind et al (2010). 
McKnight (1999) discusses the regulatory aspect of the problem.  
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In countries with weak regulatory framework, number of candidates may also 
increase due to the fudging of electoral expenditure by major incumbents through 
independents and small political parties. In fact, floating a large number of 
candidates itself could be a strategy to avoid rigorous financial audit because 
with fixed public resources in the short run, the more the number of candidates, 
the less will be the per-candidate time devoted for regulation. Further, floating 
independents may help parties to have additional electoral agents in different 
polling booths in a constituency. In many developing economies, sometimes it is 
difficult to establish identities of voters. Support or objection of a ―neutral‖ agent 
may convince electoral officers about identities of voters more than the agents of 
mainstream parties.6  
 
Obviously, rationality of electoral choice demands that political parties may not 
engage themselves in this type of game in all the constituencies all the time. 
Clearly, if a political party is certain to win election, it has no incentive to 
unnecessarily engage itself in unethical practices. Therefore, such behavior may 
manifest in select constituencies and, in a time period when political competition 
or uncertainty is high. The extent of unsavory politics in that constituency would 
then further depend on the financial strengths of the major political parties and 
the pay-offs associated with that election. A direct consequence of all these is not 
only an increase in the average number of candidates, but also an increase in its 
variability – both across constituencies and over time. A good regulatory 
framework, however, must study the incentives of political parties under different 
situations at the constituency level and build firewalls accordingly. Our normative 
position in this paper is that electoral regulations should attempt to block short-
term opportunistic or manipulative entries and at the same time should be 
sensitive to long-term entries guided by diversity. 
 
This paper studies electoral regulations that control short-term opportunistic 
entries (e.g., through cloning) of candidates. Theoretical literature on voting has 
already identified rules under which some opportunistic entries like cloning 
cannot occur. Unfortunately, these rules are not easily comprehensible and are 
too complex to implement in elections involving a large population. These rules 
often require voters to rank their preferences for all candidates and, therefore, 
takes hundred per cent literacy as granted. Further, in practice, the need for 
detailed ranking in these schemes is likely to slow down the electoral process 
and increase the transaction cost of an election. In comparison to the theoretical 
literature, there appears to be few studies on regulatory implications of 
manipulative political behavior in case of common voting rules like the FPTP. 
  
The plan of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 presents a brief survey on 
regulatory practices relating to entry in elections in a select set of developed 
                                                 
6
 Accusations of false voting by the parties in opposition are common in India. For example, 
during the parliamentary election of 2009, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) filed a complaint with 
the ECI, alleging that Delhi‘s electoral roll had more than 1.1 million fake voters. (Indian Express, 
January 24, 2009).  
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countries whose electoral systems are either same (e.g., FPTP) or closely similar 
to that of India. With this review as a point of reference, in Section 3 we examine 
the impact of policy tools to control regulation of entry in case of India. Finally, 
Section 4 proposes a set of policy options and concludes the paper.  
 
 
2 What Type of Regulations Are Followed in Practice? 
 
Regulation of entry of candidates in elections can be thought of as a principal-
agent problem. One approach to take care of this problem is to put restrictions on 
the entry of potential agents, so that only those who have some minimum 
qualification can pass through the filtering process.7 In practice, all democracies 
follow this approach, often with legal backing.8  Other than compulsory 
restrictions, a set of good practices are also encouraged.  
 
In this section, we compare restrictions imposed on candidate entry by select 
countries. The comparison is done in two parts. In Subsection 2.1, the focus is on 
a small set of developed countries that have long histories of democratic 
governance. Such a choice is a conscious one because it is expected that these 
countries would follow international best practices on electoral regulation. 
Besides India, the countries considered are: (i) the United Kingdom (UK), (ii) 
Australia, (iii) New Zealand and, (iv) Canada. Expectedly, regulatory frameworks 
in these countries have a lot of common ground. However, as we shall show, the 
finer details could vary substantially across countries. 
 
Unfortunately, electoral rules and regulations in the four selected countries were 
centralized. Further, changes in them were infrequent over time and occurred 
concomitantly with the changes in socioeconomic and political environment. As a 
result, one encounters a problem in attributing the cause of change in number of 
candidates to changes in the regulatory environment alone. Fortunately, the 
United States (US) is a country where different states in it had followed different 
sets of regulations. Easy availability of counterfactuals in the case of the US 
allows us to study the impacts of policy tools on electoral regulation rigorously. In 
Subsection 2.2, we study the experience of the US separately.  
 
2.1 A cross-country comparison of electoral rules and regulations on 
candidate entry in elections 
  
Electoral regulations that have direct implications on candidate entry can be 
divided into four broad categories: viz.,  
i. To ensure electoral participation of mature candidates with good character 
and right incentives 
                                                 
7
 Note that, in case of firms, shareholders can restrict the number of applicants by putting 
education and experience as explicit criteria for qualification for the job of CEO. 
8
 In case of India, Sections 32, 33 and 34 of the Representation of the People Act specify the 
legal restrictions. 
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ii. To increase transaction costs of non-serious candidates 
iii. To disbar candidates participating from more than one constituencies 
iv. To disallow entries that could lead to confusion among voters. 
 
Each of these categories involves many finer regulatory issues. Some of these 
issues fall in gray areas and there is no easy way to resolve them objectively 
without imposing one‘s own norms or values. We now discuss them one by one:  
 
i. To ensure mature candidates with good character and the right 
incentives 
 
Virtually all democracies impose age restrictions on entry of candidates. While 
there is uniform suffrage above a certain age (in most cases, 18 years), the 
minimum age necessary to be a candidate could be higher. The age typically 
varies between 18 years (UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada) to 25 years 
(India). 
 
While it is not possible to define ―good character‖ explicitly, one may not allow 
candidates with a disreputable history. For example, criminally convicted persons 
(under sentence or subject to be sentenced for any offence punishable under the 
law by imprisonment beyond a cut-off period) are generally not allowed to be 
candidates. In case of the UK and Australia, the cut-off period is one year. In 
case of New Zealand just a sentence to imprisonment is enough for disbarment. 
In case of Canada, there does not appear to be an explicit restriction. 
 
Similarly, approach to bankruptcy also varies among the countries selected. In 
case of the UK and Australia, bankrupts or financially insolvent persons are not 
allowed to be candidates, whereas in case of New Zealand and Canada, such a 
restriction is not imposed. 
 
One major gray area here is: what happens to candidates against whom court 
cases are going on? Many would argue that establishment of guilt in a court of 
law is a necessity to disbar a candidate. If not, all political parties will then have 
strong incentives to falsely implicate their rivals in court cases before elections. 
However, in many developing countries court cases drag on for years. As a 
result, the provision of conviction can be easily circumvented. In the meantime, 
the person against whom a case is going on is free to contest elections and if he 
(she) wins and acquires political muscle, it becomes harder for investigative 
agencies to prosecute him (her).  
 
It is here that good practices on information dissemination could play a role. In 
India, candidates have to submit a compulsory affidavit in which information 
relating to court cases must be disseminated (Section 33A of the Representation 
of the People Act, 1951, with effect from 24 August, 2002). This type of additional 
disclosure of information by candidates may not eradicate the problem of 
criminalization, but is expected to reduce it to some extent.   
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Similarly, to avoid conflict of interest, persons who belong to particular 
professions in the public sector (e.g., civil servants, judges, members of police or 
military, government nominated directors of large commercial companies etc.) 
are generally not allowed to take part in elections as candidates. Such persons, if 
they want to participate, must resign from their position. A gray area here is 
whether such persons should be allowed to fight elections immediately or after a 
gestation period to avoid conflict of interest more stringently. Obviously, there is 
no easy answer to that question. Country approaches here also could vary 
sharply. For example, an exception to this rule is New Zealand where as per the 
Electoral Act, state servants who stand as candidates need not resign, but must 
take leave of absence from the nomination day till the first working day after 
election. 
 
Interestingly, there is no barrier relating to education or health of the candidates 
in the select countries. In the Indian case, however, dissemination of information 
relating to educational status of the candidate is compulsory. 
 
ii. To increase transaction costs of non-serious candidates 
 
If electoral participation is costless, there could be too many ―non-serious‖ 
candidates. To ensure manageability of the electoral process, generally two 
types of regulations that increase the transaction cost of participation are 
followed: 
 
(a) Submission of a deposit fee 
 
At the time of filing nomination, all candidates have to submit a pre-specified 
amount of deposit. The deposit fee is returned to the candidate if the total 
number of votes polled by him (her) crosses a pre-specified threshold. Clearly, a 
high deposit fee could act as an impediment in case of non-serious candidates. 
However, if it is too high, it discriminates the poorer section of a country and the 
regulatory literature does not provide a unique answer on how high is ―too high‖. 
 
The amount of the deposit and the fraction of votes needed for refunding vary 
substantially across the selected countries. The required deposit money is GBP 
500 in case of the UK, AUD 1000 in case of Australia, NZD 300 in case of New 
Zealand, CD 1000 in case of Canada and INR 25,000 in case of India. The 
fractions of votes needed for a refund are generally less than or equal to 5.0 per 
cent of total votes in all countries, the exception being India where one needs at 
least one-sixth of the total number of valid votes polled by all the candidates 
[Section 158(4), the Representation of the People ACT].  
 
It may be noted that the standard of living varies across countries. To examine 
whether the deposit fee could act as a deterrent to entry, we compute deposit fee 
in a country as percentage of annual per-capita nominal gross domestic product 
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(GDP) of that country and plot them in Figure 1.  Figure 1 reveals that compared 
to the four countries selected, the deposit fee in India is currently very high. In 
none of the four countries, the ratio crosses even 5.0 per cent whereas in the 
India, it is close to 40.0 per cent.  
 
 
 
 
 
In case of regulations relating to deposits, there are two other issues: 
 Should the regulatory authority have the power to determine the deposit fee? 
 Should the fee be uniform for all candidates or across all constituencies? 
 
To answer the first question, one may ask why should a few unelected 
bureaucrats have the power to affect entry into the electoral process? This power 
could be taken away from the bureaucrats by specifying the exact amount of 
deposit needed in the electoral act, as in India. However, the problem is that in 
many developing countries, the rate of inflation is high. Since elections are held 
after a few years, the real value of deposit often gets eroded and unless the 
amount prescribed in the law changes concomitantly, it may not effectively 
prevent non-serious candidates from participation.9 To answer the second 
question, we note that India is the only case (among the countries selected) 
where a part of the population (SC or ST candidates) pay half the deposit 
required. The amount of deposit, however, is not region or constituency specific 
in any of these five countries. 
 
(b) Regulations that ensure a minimum level of support 
 
To demonstrate seriousness, at the time of filing of nomination papers, a 
candidate has to show signatures of a certain minimum number of electors in that 
                                                 
9
 The electoral authorities could be given the power with some standard checks and balances. A 
possible option would be that any proposed change in deposit requirement by the electoral 
authority should also meet the approval of the Supreme Court of that country. Another option 
would be to empower the parliament to either accept or reject the amount proposed by the 
electoral authority before each election within a stipulated period after the receipt of the proposal. 
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constituency supporting his (her) nomination. Unlike deposit fee, this regulation 
does not economically discriminate the poor. Since people‘s support is an 
essential ingredient in the democratic process, one may argue that this regulation 
reflects the spirit of democracy better compared to the requirement of a deposit. 
However, while deposit requirement increases the transaction costs of only the 
candidates, signature requirements increases the transaction costs of both the 
candidates and the regulators (because of associated transaction costs needed 
for verification of signatures). As a result, a high signature requirement 
necessitates more public resources.  
 
As in the case of deposit fee, none of the five selected countries vary minimum 
signature required across constituencies. However, the extents of signature 
requirement vary a lot across these countries, only one in Canada, two in New 
Zealand and ten in the UK. In case of Australia, the signature required is fifty for 
candidates not endorsed by a party.  However, all incumbents need only one 
signature for nomination. The Indian rule is similar to that of Australia, albeit less 
stringent. In India, national and state party candidates need only one signature, 
while others require ten. 
 
 
 
 
 
As average constituency sizes in these countries could be different, to compare 
the figures we plot the signature requirements in these countries per ten 
thousand electors in a constituency in Figure 2. To arrive at these figures, we first 
divide the total electors in a country in a year (in a scale of ten thousand) by the 
number of seats in its lower house. The signature requirement for fringe 
candidates is divided by these figures.  Figure 2 reveals that among the countries 
selected, signature requirement in India – after adjusting for the differences in the 
size of electors -- is the lowest. The closest to India in Figure 2 is Canada, which 
is still more than 150% of the Indian value. We also note to have similar adjusted 
signature requirement as in the UK or Australia, the absolute signature 
requirement in India need to be 188 and 703 respectively.  
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Interestingly, electoral rules do not generally mention that supporters of different 
candidates have to be distinct. An exception appears to be the UK, where it is 
explicitly mentioned that ―subscribers can only subscribe one nomination paper 
at the election‖ (Para 3.43, ―Guidance for Candidates and Agents: 2011 UK 
Parliamentary by-elections in Great Britain‖). This stringent regulation, in fact, is 
enacted and is Rule 7(5) of Parliamentary Electoral Rules, which form Schedule 
1 of the Representation of the People Act).  
 
iii. Simultaneous participation from many constituencies 
 
Practice regarding this regulation is more stringent in all the four selected 
countries compared to India. Candidates in these countries are not allowed to run 
from more than one constituency. In case of India, till the early 1990s, one could 
be a candidate in as many constituencies as one liked. However, due to 
proliferation of candidates, subsequent regulations in India explicitly forbade 
individuals to fight from more than two constituencies concurrently. 
 
In practice, due to high intra-party competition, candidature from two 
constituencies is a privilege that is typically available only for the top leader of a 
party, that too when the political situation is uncertain and volatile. One 
celebrated case in India is that of Indira Gandhi who in 1980 fought from two 
constituencies (viz., Rae Bareli in Uttar Pradesh and Medak in Andhra Pradesh) 
and won in both. In a personality driven polity, no top leader from any political 
party in India has any incentive to change this rule that could make their own 
positions precarious in a period of uncertainty. The history of this regulation 
confirms the observation of Boix (1999) that electoral rules are set by political 
elites in a way so that they could perpetuate their dominance.10 
  
iv. To avoid confusions among voters 
 
The regulatory authorities sometimes proscribe electoral practices that could  
confuse voters. Among the countries selected, the guidelines in case of the UK 
appear to be the clearest about this aspect. It explicitly mentions that no other 
party can register the same or confusingly similar name / identity marks that are 
already registered. Also party names that may cause confusion in the ballot 
paper like ―None of the Above‖ or ―Put a Cross Here‖ are not allowed. Similarly, 
party symbols that are confusingly similar to registered symbol of another party 
are not allowed. There is no clear guideline on what constitutes ―confusingly 
similar‖. Apparently, the power to decide that lies with the regulatory authority 
and is dealt on case-by-case basis.  
 
                                                 
10
 Interestingly, when a leader wins from two constituencies simultaneously and vacates one, the 
cost for by-election in the vacated constituency is borne by the population of the country. To that 
extent, there is a case in changing the electoral law in India so that the cost of such a by-election 
is borne by that leader. 
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The gray area here relates to the duplication of names of candidates. A possible 
strategy to cause confusion could be to float a candidate whose name is either 
same or confusingly similar to the major rival. The policy dilemma here is that 
one cannot discriminate entries into the electoral arena on the basis of names. 
Further, duplication of candidate names in itself is no ―proof‖ of cloning. It is well 
known that a free rider whose name is the same as that of a party candidate has 
incentives to take advantage of that situation by deciding to participate in an 
election.  
 
From regulatory agency‘s perspective, it is difficult to determine who is a free 
rider and who is a clone. However, recognition of incentives could be of help 
here. The strategy of duplication of names could be successful as long as 
electors are unaware about such duplication. Therefore, political parties floating 
such clones would not want to expose the clone candidate to the electors. A free-
rider, in contrast, would like to advertise the duplication actively. Regulatory 
authorities, therefore, needs to study the campaign styles of such candidates. In 
case they are convinced of the existence of clones in a constituency, 
dissemination of information to the electorate through the media could be one 
means through which this type of unsavory electoral behavior could be 
controlled.  
 
It may be noted that besides the above regulations, there are a few others like 
rigor in information dissemination or rigor in financial audit that may not directly 
block or restrict entries of candidates, but can affect entries of candidates 
indirectly through a complex transmission mechanism. A full discussion on their 
roles is, however, beyond the scope of the present study. 
 
2.2 The US experience 
 
The US political system does not favor independent candidates or small parties. 
Lem and Dowling (2006) in that context observed: 
 
“…Democrats and Republicans do not often agree, but one thing they do 
agree on is that they both dislike third parties.” 
 
Political competition in the US is, therefore, depends on the incentives of the 
Republicans and the Democrats who control the US government between 
themselves and could pass legislation that restricts entries of other candidates. 
These restrictions include, but are not limited to, filing fees and signature 
requirement (Lem and Dowling, 2006). Besides the two major tools in 2.1, 
McKnight (1999) discusses three other types of statutes used in the US to 
regulate candidate entry, viz., (i) the early filing deadline, (ii) the ―sore loser‖ 
statute, and, (iii) a disaffiliation statute. 
 
Early filing of nomination papers of the independents could be an effective way to 
block the entries of rebel candidates who did not get official party nominations. 
Further, this has also some limited potential to check prisoners‘ dilemma type of 
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games involving clone candidates. Obviously, if the official nominees of parties 
are uncertain, cloning becomes difficult. However, if cloning is dependent on 
party ideologies rather than individuals, then this strategy is not going to be 
successful. Further, early filing takes away the right of the population to fight 
against particular candidates as a protest. 
 
In parts of the US, a ―sore loser‖ statute prevents a defeated primary candidate 
from appearing on the general election ballot as an independent, although such a 
candidate remains eligible for election through write-in votes. Interestingly, all US 
courts that have heard challenges to sore loser statutes have upheld them 
(McKnight, 1999). However, this could be an effective approach only if primary 
elections are held. 
 
The disaffiliation statute is also a common way to regulate independent 
candidates in the US. By a statutory deadline, a candidate who is an independent 
will register non-affiliation with any party and refrain from voting in any party's 
primary. The party registration system provides some check on the candidate. An 
individual who has not registered the appropriate disaffiliation by the statutory 
deadline is considered not an independent. However, if there is no clear and 
functional registration system of members within a party in a country, there is no 
effective way to verify whether an individual is connected with a particular party. 
 
The major policy tools that affect candidate entry in the US are, however, deposit 
fee and signature requirements. Minimum signature requirements in the US vary 
substantially across states. Lem and Dowling (2006) observed that in Alabama 
an independent candidate or a new party would need signatures equal to 3 
percent of the previous gubernatorial vote, translating to 39,536 votes in the 2002 
election. In contrast, New Jersey the requirement was static and was only 800 
signatures. Lem and Dowling (2006), however, reports lack of availability of a 
comprehensive and comparable data set on deposit fees. 
 
The variation of regulations across states in the US enables one to study their 
impacts on candidate entry. Some such studies are: Ansolabehere and Gerber 
(1996), Stratman (2005), Burden (2007) and Drometer and Rincke (2008). 
Results from these studies suggest that increase in deposit affects entries of 
independent candidates significantly as the non-serious free-riders among them 
drop out of the race. However, increase in deposit does not affect entries of 
minor parties because compared to independent candidates, these parties are in 
a stronger financial position. Rather, signature requirement poses the more 
challenging barrier for them. Signature requirement affects the transaction cost of 
their participation directly and if increased, many of these parties may back out 
unless there is a strong motivation behind their participation. Comparing the two 
policy tools, Stratmann (2005) observes that signature requirement is likely to 
involve larger transaction cost than deposit. Similar opinion is also shared by 
Lem and Doiwling (2006).  
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3 Influence of Policy Tools on Candidate Entry in India 
 
Analysis of Indian electoral data reveals that the proportion of constituencies with 
more than 10 candidates rose steadily from 24.5 per cent in 1980 to 82.5 per 
cent in 1996. 11 After the huge influx of candidates in the 1996 parliamentary 
election (13952 for 543 seats), policy intervention reduced this proportion sharply 
to 27.78 per cent in 1998 and 26.30 per cent in 1999 Lok Sabha elections. 
However, since 1999, the number of candidates once again shows an increasing 
trend. For the Lok Sabha elections in 2004 and 2009, the proportion rose to 
39.78 and 71.45 per cent respectively. 
 
A deeper analysis of Indian electoral data reveals the presence of 47 cases in 
India where the total number of candidates in a constituency was greater than 
50. All such cases had occurred between 1989 and 1996, a period reflecting 
political fragmentation and uncertainty in India. Other than 6 cases (viz., Palani in 
Tamil Nadu; Hyderabad, Secunderabad and Nalgonda in Andhra Pradesh; 
Belgaum in Karnataka; and, Nagpur in Maharashtra), all the remaining 41 were 
from the extended Hindi belt (e.g., including Delhi, Chandigarh and the state of 
Haryana). Except Palani in 1989, the remaining five occurred in 1996. 
 
Interestingly, other than six constituencies – all in the metropolitan region of Delhi 
(e.g., New Delhi, South Delhi, Outer Delhi, East Delhi, Chandi Chowk and Delhi 
Sadar) – none of the remaining constituencies in India had more than fifty 
candidates twice between 1962 and 2009. In fact, except six constituencies 
(South Delhi, Outer Delhi, East Delhi, Chandni Chowk, Delhi Sadar and Indore), 
no other constituencies among the 47 had more than 30 candidates in each of 
the two preceding elections. We argue that this observed lack of stability in 
candidate structure at the constituency level cannot be explained in terms of 
typical slow evolution of cleavages, as articulated by Chhibber (1999) or and 
Mitra and Singh (1999). Nor can these cases be explained in terms of 
institutional environment which, in India, did not change much over time. The 
observed sharp jump in the number of candidates can only be explained in terms 
of opportunistic entries, often in the form of rebel and clone candidates.12  
 
Many Indian political parties are personality driven and a significant part of the 
leadership of such parties consists of descendants, close relatives and cronies of 
leaders whose authority cannot be challenged through intra-party elections. The 
local support bases of such parties, however, are often heterogeneous and are 
                                                 
11
 The detailed data on election results (for all parliamentary constituencies in all elections) are 
available at the ECI website, http://eci.nic.in. The reference period in this study is from 1962 to 
2009. 
12
 A simple Google search with strings like ―rebel candidates‖ and ―India‖ leads to too many 
newspaper and magazine reports indicating their presence, e.g., Times of India (April 6, 2009) 
describes the situation in Maharashtra in 2009 and Indian Express (January 17, 2012) describes 
the situation in case of the assembly election of 2012 in Punjab.  
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divided by many cleavages like caste, religion, region etc. (Kamath, 1985; 
Chibber and Petrocik, 2002). The non-transparency in candidate selection 
process often leads to open fight among these factions during elections. Across 
political parties, the process of complex coalition formation at the central level 
might also lead to rebellion by local party units if the later are not ready to 
sacrifice for the ―big picture‖.13 In specific cases, an unsavory fight across political 
parties might lead to floating ―clone‖ independent candidates.  
 
The problem of high number of candidates and the consequent malpractices 
bothered the ECI for a long time in India.14 The ECI had time and again 
articulated the possibility that major political parties had surreptitiously floated 
fringe candidates for their own gain. The diagnosis of the problem by the Law 
Commission of India (LCI), and the National Commission to Review the Working 
of the Constitution (NCRWC) were also similar. LCI (1999) highlighted the ―non-
seriousness‖ of the fringe candidates. In Section 2, we noted that a particular 
form of cloning is to float candidates with the same name. In this context, it also 
observed that in order to ―mislead the masses‖, quite a few persons of the name 
―V. K. Malhotra‖ stood as independent candidates against the ―real‖ V. K. 
Malhotra, one of the BJP candidates in Delhi in a Lok Sabha election (Para 
3.3.3). NCRWC (2002) in this context observed that most of the so called 
independent candidates were ―dummy candidates or defectors from their parties 
on being denied party tickets‖ (Vol-I, Para 4.20.3). Despite these observations, 
apparently, the strategy of cloning was pursued with impunity by the major 
political parties in India. For example, in the Arakkonam constituency in Tamil 
Nadu in 2004, where the main fight was between ―Velu, R‖ of PMK and 
―Shanmugam, M‖ of ADMK, there were 4 independent candidates with names 
―Velu‖ and 2 independent candidates with names ―Shanmugam‖ (Bhattacharya, 
2010). Recently, in cases where it found evidence, the ECI had started to take 
action against this type of candidates. For example, finding that several 
independent candidates in Kadapa Lok Sabha and Pulivendula assembly 
constituencies were canvassing on behalf of major political parties in the by-
elections scheduled on May 8, 2011, the ECI decided to crack the whip on 
them.15  
 
In so far as policies are concerned, LCI (1999) recommended that independent 
candidates should be debarred from contesting Lok Sabha elections (Para 3.3.4). 
Subsequently, NCRWC (2002) suggested inter alia that:  (i) if any independent 
candidate fails to win five percent of the vote or more, he should be debarred 
                                                 
13
 For example, the Hindu (April 04, 2009) in an article on election in Andhra Pradesh observed: 
‗Leaders of the Grand Alliance are worried over vote sharing and prospects of the official 
candidates in nine Assembly and two Lok Sabha constituencies with ―unofficial‖ nominees not 
paying heed to their warnings to withdraw from the contest.‘ 
14
 Verma (2009) provides a review of unethical practices and their prevention during elections in 
the Indian context. Kumar (2002) reviews the history of electoral reforms in India in brief.  
15
 "We will withdraw the security given to them, take back the vehicles and deny them access to 
polling booths. And if they do not give a proper response to our notices, we will prevent them from 
contesting," said chief electoral officer Bhanwar Lal (Times of India, May 1, 2011). 
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from contesting for the same office for six years (Vol-1, Para 4.20.4), and, (ii) an 
independent candidate who loses election three times consecutively for the same 
office should be permanently debarred from contesting election to that office 
(Vol-1, Para 4.20.4). These recommendations are in line with the views 
emanated from the ECI. Our review in Section 2, however, suggests that lack of 
manageability and malpractices notwithstanding, policies like debarring 
independent candidates and small parties tend to be on the extreme side.  
 
 
 
 
 
To control candidate entry in India, different expert groups (e.g., the ECI, the 
NCRWC, the LCI etc) in the past had also recommended an increase in the 
security deposit of candidates.16 Some of these recommendations got reflected in 
an amendment of the Representation of the People Act in India in 2009. 
Unfortunately, the views expressed by these groups appear to be judgmental, as 
the recommendations were not backed by an analysis of the possible impact of 
the changes in the policy tools on candidate entry.  
 
The deposit fee for parliamentary election was Rs.500/- in 1951.17 It was 
increased to Rs.10,000/- after the huge influx of number of candidates in 1996 
parliamentary election (by changing Section 34 of the Representation of the 
People Act, 1951, with effect from 1 August, 1996). The second and the last 
change occurred after the parliamentary election of 2009, when it was increased 
to Rs.25,000/-.  
 
Figure 3 presents the movement of deposit as a percentage of nominal GDP per-
capita in India. By juxtaposing Figure 3 to Figure 1, one clearly comes to the 
                                                 
16
 NCRWC (2002), in fact, recommended a separate deposit scheme for independent candidates 
(Vol-1, Para 4.20.4). 
17
 We consider the required deposit fee for candidates belonging to general categories only. Also, 
although the series in Figure 3 is a discrete variable, we present a line diagram here as a 
continuous approximation. 
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conclusion that the deposit fee in India was high during the early period after 
Indian independence compared to the current international benchmark. In fact, in 
the year 1951, it was more than 100.0% implying an ―average‖ Indian would have 
to keep more than his annual income as deposit. Figure 3 also reveals that due 
to growth in per-capita income and constancy of the deposit, this figure gradually 
reduced and was much closer to international benchmark between 1980 and 
1995. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 plots the movement of real deposit in India. Real deposit is calculated as 
the nominal deposit deflated by the wholesale price index (WPI). Figure 4 
highlights that when the first change in deposit took place in 1996, it had shrunk 
to about (1/20)-th of its real value in 1951. Interestingly, the two changes in 
deposit in 1996 and 2009, attempted to restore it near its original level in 1951. 
However, real income in India was also growing. That is why Figure 3 shows an 
overall downward trend, while Figure 4 does not. Both Figures 3 and 4, however, 
reveal that besides political fragmentation, financial opportunity to be a candidate 
increased gradually in India since the 1950s and was at its peak during the first 
half of the 1990s.  
 
It may be noted that the ECI had formally proposed that it be given the power to 
prescribe deposit before each election. Looking forward, it is easy to show that at 
an average annual rate of inflation of 5.0 per-cent (which is close to the current 
actual annual rate of inflation in India), the real values of Rs.25,000/- in 2014, 
2019 and 2024 would be Rs.19,588/-, Rs.15,348/- and Rs.12,025 respectively. 
Clearly, if prices and income increase at a high rate without concomitant changes 
in the deposit, the later would cease to be an effective barrier to candidate entry. 
To that extent, there is a case in changing the electoral law to delegate the power 
of imposition of deposit to the ECI subject to some standard checks and 
balances discussed in Subsection 2.1.  
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Despite substantial changes in deposit, the scope of analyzing its true impact in 
India is fraught with problems. First, the changes in deposit were too infrequent. 
As a result, any analysis of its impact will be weak because it will have limited 
counterfactuals to work on. Second, since our reference period ends with the 
2009 parliamentary election, we cannot analyze the impact of the latest policy 
changes.  Third, regulators in India took a few other measures along with the 
increase in the deposit simultaneously in 1996; the minimum signature 
requirement for independents and registered but unrecognized political parties 
was also raised from 1 elector to 10 electors concurrently (Section 33 of the 
Representation of the People Act, 1951, with effect from 1 August, 1996). 
Further, simultaneous entry as candidate from more than two constituencies was 
also blocked in 1996. Since these consist of the only major policy changes in our 
reference period, Indian electoral data will not be able to clearly separate in 
causal terms to what extent the change in the number of candidates per seat 
could be attributed to increase in deposit alone.  
 
Despite these limitations, we argue that the observed post-1996 change in 
candidate structure was primarily due to increase in deposit. Common sense 
suggests that the additional ―cost‖ due to the increase in the signature 
requirement would be a small one. The impact is likely to be non-linear (e.g., the 
marginal ―cost‖ of obtaining the 100-th signature is expected to be much more 
than the 10-th). As a result, it would be an effective deterrent only if the minimum 
requirement is high.   We argue that a candidate can easily collect ten signatures 
from his or her own family and close circle of friends. We also observe that 
political parties have little incentive to offer the same candidate more than two 
seats.  Even rebel candidates may not have incentives to appear in three or more 
seats in an election simultaneously. Thus, it is likely that other than reducing the 
entries of a few cranks, the move on restriction on simultaneous participation did 
not influence candidate entry much. 
 
To study the impact of deposit, we specify and estimate a few regression 
equations. The dependent variable in all these equations is TOTCAN, the 
average number of candidates per constituency in a given parliamentary election. 
We specify that the two major factors that would affect its movement over time 
would be political fragmentation and the ―cost‖ of participation in an election.  
 
Political fragmentation is empirically measured in this study alternatively by two 
variables, viz., (i) the average number of non-independent candidates per 
constituency (NONIND), and, (ii) the average number of national and state 
parties per constituency (NATSTAT). We are reluctant to use ex post measures 
of political fragmentation like those in Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) because 
these measures are based on vote shares.  At the time of the decision of 
electoral participation, exact vote shares are unknown to the candidates. Ex post 
measures implicitly assume perfect foresight which is unlikely to be met in reality. 
Therefore, despite limitations, we prefer to use ex ante measures of political 
fragmentation as defined above. The ―cost‖ of participation is also measured in 
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this study alternatively by two variables, viz., (i) deposit fee as a percentage of 
per-capita income (DEEPPER), and, (ii) real deposit (REALDEP). Since the total 
numbers of constituencies for different parliamentary elections were different, all 
regression equations were estimated by weighted least squares (WLS) 
technique, with the number of constituencies for different years as weights.  
 
 
       Table 1: Regression Results Reflecting the Impact of Deposit 
 
 Variables 
 
(1) 
Dependent Variable: TOTCAN 
Period: 1962 to 2009 Period: 1962 to 1996 
Eq 1 
(2) 
Eq 2 
(3) 
Eq 3 
(4) 
Eq 4 
(5) 
Eq 5 
(6) 
Eq 6 
(7) 
Eq 7 
(8) 
Eq 8 
(9) 
Intercept 
-3.041 
(-0.78) 
-7.475 
(-2.48)@ 
5.577 
(1.39) 
2.298 
(0.86) 
-6.065 
(-1.55) 
-5.430 
(-1.38) 
-2.425 
(-0.53) 
-1.900 
(-0.41) 
NATSTAT 
5.085 
(5.03)# 
6.509 
(7.69)# 
----- ----- 
6.044 
(5.69)# 
5.995 
(5.73)# 
----- ----- 
NONIND ----- ----- 
1.868 
(2.73)@ 
2.745 
(5.29)# 
----- ----- 
3.787 
(4.07)# 
3.748 
(4.09)# 
DEPPER 
--0.092 
(--3.99)# 
----- 
--0.089 
(--2.58)@ 
----- 
--0.076 
(--3.32)# 
----- 
--0.049 
(--1.45) 
----- 
REALDEP ----- 
--0.019 
(-4.82)# 
----- 
--0.020 
(--3.71)# 
----- 
--0.024 
(-3.42)# 
----- 
--0.016 
(--1.54) 
R
2
 0.86 0.89 0.71 0.80 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.87 
 0.83 0.87 0.65 0.76 0.89 0.90 0.82 0.82 
Note: The bracketed numbers are t-statistics. Here, #, @ and $ indicate significance at 
1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. ―Eq‖ in this table stands for equations. 
 
 
Given the simultaneity in policy changes, the results of the regressions based on 
the data from 1962 to 2004 should be interpreted with caution. This is because a 
part of the post-1996 impact of changes in deposit – however small – will also 
contain the impact of the changes in other regulatory variables. Fortunately, 
between 1962 and 1996, the only policy variables that changed were either 
DEPPER or REALDEP. We, therefore, carry out regressions of TOTCAN on the 
same set of variables once from 1962 to 2009, [Columns (2) to (5) in Table 1] 
and, once from 1962 to 1996 [Columns (6) to (9) in Table 1].  
 
All the explanatory variables in Table 1 appear with correct signs. Also, all 
equations reported in Table 1 have good explanatory power. Taken together 
these results imply that political fragmentation and financial opportunity for 
participation jointly can explain the evolution of the number of candidates in 
Indian parliamentary elections well. Further, close similarity of results among 
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Equations in columns (2) to (5) and their counterparts in columns (6) to (9) 
confirms our claim that it is the changes in deposit that primarily affected 
candidate entry in India, not the other concomitant changes. Interestingly, 
DEPPER and REALDEP, when used with NONIND, are not statistically 
significant in columns (8) and (9); however, when used with NATSTAT, both are 
statistically significant. This is because NONIND being closer to TOTCAN than 
NATSTAT, it explains a major part of variation in TOTCAN alone. 
 
Estimates based on Equation 2, the best among Equations 1 to 4 in terms of 
goodness of fit,  reveal that when real deposit is close to zero, an average Lok 
Sabha constituency with only two major party candidates would have about five 
to six total number of candidates. However, a value of real deposit of Rs.100/- in 
1952-53 prices (e.g., approximately Rs. 4067.13 in 2008-09 prices) would reduce 
this average between three and four. Interestingly, as per Equation 2, the 
presence of an additional national or state party candidate would on an average 
increase the total number of candidates by 6.5.Other equations provide closely 
similar estimates.  
 
Table 2: Deposit Needed (in 2008-09 Prices) to Control Total Number of 
Candidates (TOTCAN) to a Targeted  Level for a Given Number of Candidates of 
National and State Level Parties (NATSTAT) 
TOTCAN 
NATSTAT 
(Estimates based on Eq 2) (Estimates based on Eq 6) 
2 3 4 2 3 4 
6 -978.25 12954.88 26888.01 949.00 11108.35 21267.70 
8 -5259.44 8673.69 22606.82 -2440.28 7719.07 17878.43 
10 -9540.63 4392.50 18325.63 -5829.55 4329.80 14489.15 
 
 
The estimated equations also help us to prepare some policy scenarios. Table 2 
presents some scenarios that are based on Equations 2 and 6. These equations 
are chosen because they appear to be the best among Equations 1-4 and 5-8 
respectively. Table 2 reveals that in case of a direct fight between two major 
parties, if the regulators want to control total number of candidates in 
constituencies up to six, then as per Equation 2, there may not be any need of 
deposit requirement. If, however, due to fragmentation in polity, the major party 
candidates increase to four, one would need a deposit of about Rs.26,888/- to 
control the total number of candidates up to six. Estimates based on Equation 6 
are close to corresponding ones in Equation 2. 
 
These scenarios suggest that until a stable two-party system in India emerges, to 
regulate candidate entry, policymakers would need to keep the deposit 
consistently at a very high level compared to the current international benchmark.  
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Interestingly, the other policy tool of increasing the signature requirement has not 
been considered as a major option by various expert groups in India, whereas 
the US experience in our review suggests that it could be an effective tool in 
controlling the number of candidates, especially in a large and a heterogeneous 
country like India. In Section 4, we propose one such scheme in which this policy 
tool could be used flexibly. 
 
  
4    Conclusion 
 
Given the presence of large number of candidates in Indian parliamentary 
elections and the regulatory concerns such presence has evoked, our paper 
reviewed the process of candidate entry in select developed countries. The 
review revealed that despite many similarities in the basic approach towards 
regulation, detailed rules relating to candidate entry vary substantially across 
countries. Based on this review, the paper argues that in the Indian context one 
need not recommend an extreme policy position like debarring fringe candidates, 
as had been suggested by several expert groups in the past.  
 
We observe that between deposit fee and signature requirement, Indian 
policymakers had largely relied on the first.  Our empirical analysis suggests that 
an increase in deposit fee had a significant negative impact on candidate entry in 
India. However, for effective deterrence on continuous basis, India needs to 
sustain deposit at a very high level compared to the current international 
benchmark and that could discriminate political participation of genuinely 
underprivileged groups. Reliance on deposit alone would require frequent 
changes in it and to that extent we are supportive of the proposal to empower the 
ECI regarding the specification of the deposit before each election, provided 
some standard checks and balances are met. 
 
Signature requirement, in contrast, could have a positive side-effect for the 
deepening of local democracy and accountability. In India, candidates are usually 
nominated by the central party leadership and are simply allocated to particular 
constituencies, the practice being called ‗giving someone a ticket‘. The signature 
requirement will oblige candidates to acquire local roots or at least get them to 
keep close relations with the local electors.  
 
Unfortunately, our study reveals that the policy tool of signature requirement has 
not been used in India on a scale like the deposit fee. In contrast to deposit, we 
observe that the current level of signature requirement is low in India and can be 
easily met by a candidate from his or her own family and close circle of friends. 
Given that parliamentary constituency sizes in India are large compared to many 
other democracies, we propose a further increase of the minimum signature 
requirement. For example, a signature requirement to the level in Australia where 
all non-incumbents need at least fifty signatures would not increase the 
transaction cost of conducting elections in India substantially.  
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Our study also reveals that the problem of too many candidates is highly 
constituency specific in India. The US experience suggests that a local approach 
on signature requirement could be an effective tool in controlling electoral entry, 
especially in a large and a heterogeneous country like India. In this context, we 
suggest two policy options if the number of candidates in a constituency exceeds 
a certain cut-off limit (say, 30). As per the first option, the ECI should then have 
the power to change the minimum signature requirement up to a pre-specified 
limit (say, 100) for all candidates other than those of recognized national and 
state parties. As per the second policy option, the minimum signature 
requirement could be a pre-specified multiple of the number of candidates (say, 
20 times the total number of candidates).  
 
It may be noted that between the two options, the first one is easy to implement 
and understand. The second one, in contrast, is likely to increase the transaction 
cost of ECI, but could be a more stringent restriction on candidate entry 
compared to the first option beyond a certain threshold. Since collection and 
verification of signature requirement would take time, candidates in 
constituencies where this policy would apply may be given some more time (say, 
7 days) to fulfill the additional signature requirement failure of which would lead 
to cancellation of their nomination. Obviously, the timeline of the electoral 
process also needs to be adjusted accordingly. 
 
Finally, good practices like information dissemination and indirect restrictions like 
auditory requirements can act as potential deterrents to entry and could reduce 
the extent of opportunistic politics for short-run gain. There is an urgent need to 
strengthen these regulatory processes to improve the already substantial 
fairness of elections in India.  
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